It may seem odd to read the book Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, by Daniel Dennett, for a science class and then write a review on it. After all, as Dennett himself warned, it is not a work of science in the usual sense of the word. A work of science would present empirically gathered evidence and then draw natural conclusions based on the evidence. Afterwards, it would be peer-reviewed under the scrutiny of fellow scientists. If not that, then a work of science, would expand on or justify already preconceived scientific ideas. In those senses of the word, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea is not a work of science (though that does not mean that it does not draw new conclusions). Instead, it is a work about science. Dennett, in his book, sets out to examine the major implications of Darwin’s dangerous idea, evolution through natural selection. He makes many arguments surrounding evolution – a few examples being that it is a blind algorithmic process capable of wonders, explains many cultural phenomenons, and can be used as a basis for morality. All of this ties into the very essence and ultimate argument of the book, that evolution through natural selection is the central organizing force of the universe.

Dennett divides his book into three parts, each part into many chapters, and each chapter into many sections (English teachers might see this as a metaphor for the branching of the tree of life). The first part is a philosophical explanation of evolution and a presentation of numerous ideas that he later refers to throughout the book. He begins by detailing popular thought prior to Darwin and does so by recounting how Locke advocated a mind first view of life and how Hume came incredibly close to Darwinian thought. Darwin’s idea, then, like a universal acid that eats through everything, completely shifts tradition and thought by presenting a world organized by a simple and unintelligent algorithmic process completely devoid of mind. Dennett goes on to explain the ways of visualizing the tree of life and how difficult it is to define a species. He ends this part of the book with an analogy called the library of Mendel, the storehouse of all the possible genomes. Throughout the first part, he references the idea of greedy reductionism. Good reductionism uses cranes – useful tools that are built on preexisting foundations and that are realistic by nature. Bad, or greedy, reductionism uses skyhooks, unrealistic models that have little or no foundation. Dennett also introduces the readers to a characteristic of his writing: long analogies that leave the readers wondering, while reading the analogy, where the analogy even came from to begin with.

The Library of Mendel was a particularly interesting read. Although I just criticized Dennett’s use of long analogies, and this one is probably the longest, it stands out the most for being the most interesting to read. He begins by describing the Library of Babel and the absolute vastness of the library, while adding at the same time a touch of humor. Indeed, in a hypothetical library that contains all the possible books, it would take forever to find one that contains anything coherent. He later relates this to the Library of Mendel, a hypothetical library containing all the genomes. Because of genetic and ecological constraints, only a few “books” in this library are accessible, and therefore possible to exist. This analogy not only serves to entertain readers who might find his book to be overall dry, but also explains in layman terms possibility and actuality in evolution.

The second part deals with evolution and its specific implications within biology. Biology, according to Dennett, is engineering in the sense that it is the study of function, design, and construction. This engineering accounts for the crane-like origin of life. Later sections of the chapter are devoted to defending adaptationism and criticizing Stephen Jay Gould, one of the harshest critics of adaptationism. According to Dennett, Stephen Jay Gould presents a straw man argument that misrepresents adaptationists wary of biological constraints and that “tries to limit the power of Darwin’s dangerous idea” by relying on skyhooks. His criticism of Gould can at times be too personal and too harsh, leading to no mutual understanding and academic integrity. Based on my very limited understanding of Gould, he doesn’t seem to be relying on skyhooks, but on cranes that have pre-established foundations. His cranes introduce realistic biological constraints on evolution that Dennett seems to ignore. Dennett concludes part 2 by dealing with other examples of skyhook use, such as aliens in evolution or the revival of Lamarckian evolution. However, these topics are hardly taken with seriousness by biologist and one wonders whether or not they actually deserve a mention. Though, to be fair, Dennett only touches on these briefly.

The final part of the book is devoted to evolution and human culture. It is particularly interesting for the fact that is has little to do with biology, making it a truly interdisciplinary work. Readers already familiar with biological evolution may find this section to be the most fascinating, but may also learn why some people consider Dennett to be a Darwinian fundamentalist. He begins with a defense of memetics, a discipline that studies human culture by applying evolution. Although the scientific merits of memetics is contested (and Dennett himself admits that it is not as strong as genetics), it an innovative study that I wish to learn more about. For that reason, I congratulate Dennett for championing memetics. Dennett later moves on to long criticisms of some of the most respected intellectuals in academia, all of whom, according to him, have relied too heavily on skyhooks. Some of his criticisms are justified, particularly that of Chomsky who said language cannot be sufficiently explained by evolution. Other criticisms, I believe, aren’t so justified. One of which is his criticism of Searle’s original intentionality, which more or less means that something has meaning because we assign it meaning. We assign it meaning because we are capable of complex language, which no other organism is capable of. At the same time, computers and AI do not have consciousness, and therefore cannot assign original intentionality either, even if they can spew out coherent sentences. It seems, in the end, that humans are the only ones who can. Dennett gives a less than compelling argument for AI consciousness, for computers seem to be deterministic bots that, although also governed by an algorithmic process, certainly do not have mental features that are as complex as those of humans. Such mental features would be required for consciousness.

Dennett continues with a series of thought experiments designed to show that meaning is a result of a meaningless process. He later confronts one of his most ambitious topics – the origin of morals. He argues, as expected, for a naturalistic viewpoint while at the same time acknowledging flaws with certain sociobiologists. This, though, does not prevent Dennett from putting evolution into the picture. Through this viewpoint, he criticizes both utilitarianism and Kantian deontology. Dennett concludes his book by explaining how evolution has personally affected him.

           Dennett does mention at the beginning that he is hardly knowledgeable in evolution. A quick look at his bibliography would make one think otherwise. However, as mentioned, he very rarely attempts to scientifically defend evolution, instead focusing on the implications of evolution and how is relates to disciplines outside of biology. Although his book is intended for an educated general audience, many readers may find themselves lost in the detail. This book isn’t meant to be read in a single sitting, and many readers may find themselves, as I did, rereading some passages over again in order to better understand them. But, even though it isn’t an easy read, it does present many fresh new ideas, such as greedy reductionism and evolution as a blind algorithm. On the other hand, many of the ideas presented in the book seem to have been recycled. After all, the idea that morality can be based on evolution or that biology is like engineering isn’t really anything new. Although readers may not agree with all of his ideas, he does present them very cogently. In one section of his book, he does mention that the strength of a philosophical argument lies in the logic used, not in the conclusion drawn. I found thinking about this whenever I came upon an argument that I did not agree with.

            Darwin’s Dangerous Idea should be read as an interdisciplinary work, as Dennett himself probably intended. For that reason, it will teach something new, whether you are a biologist or a philosopher. Maybe, philosophers will learn a little bit of biology, and biologists a little bit of philosophy.